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Abstract 
A growing literature integrates debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising 
theory argues the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in its market 
value offsets changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management 
is valid even when governments only issue non-contingent bonds. Because bond returns are highly 
correlated it is known this approach implies asset positions which are large multiples of GDP. We 
show, analytically and numerically, across a wide range of model specifications (habits, productivity 
shocks, capital accumulation, persistent shocks, etc) that this is only one of the weaknesses of this 
approach. We find evidence of large fluctuations in positions, enormous changes in portfolios for 
minor changes in maturities issued and no presumption it is always optimal to issue long term debt 
and invest in short term assets. We show these extreme, volatile and unstable features are undesirable 
from a practical perspective for two reasons. Firstly the fragility of the optimal portfolio to small 
changes in model specification means it is frequently better for fear of model misspecification to 
follow a balanced budget rather than issue the optimal debt structure. Secondly we show for even 
miniscule levels of transaction costs governments would prefer a balanced budget rather than the large 
and  volatile  positions  the  complete  market  approach  recommends.  We  conclude  it  is  difficult  to 
insulate fiscal policy from shocks using the complete markets approach. Due to the yield curve’s 
limited variability maturities are a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. As a result the 
recommendations of this approach conflict with a number of features we believe are integral to bond 
market incompleteness e.g. allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, robustness etc. Our belief 
is that market imperfections need to be explicitly introduced into the model and incorporated into the 
portfolio problem. Failure to do so means that the complete market approach applied in an incomplete 
market setting can be seriously misleading. 
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 E. Faraglia, A. Marcet and A. Scott, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
Traditionally the practise of debt management has focused on either minimizing the interest cost of
borrowing, supporting short term interest rates set by monetary policy makers or assisting capital
markets through providing appropriate amounts of risk free assets and liquidity at key maturities
(see Missale (1999) for an excellent survey). A more recent literature focuses on the idea that ﬁscal
policy and debt structure should be jointly determined. This approach builds from the insight
that a key inﬂuence on ﬁscal policy is the government’s ability to oﬀset unexpected ﬂuctuations in
government expenditure or revenue by managing the size, composition and value of debt.
This ﬁscal motivation for debt management raises two important research issues. The ﬁrst is
the degree to which bond markets are characterized by incompleteness - that is the extent to which
governments are unable to issue state contingent claims. This issue is important in determining how
governments should adjust the level of debt in the face of ﬂuctuations. This question is examined
in Marcet and Scott (2009) and Scott (2007) who study the behavior of OECD ﬁscal policy and
conclude that governments are constrained by bond market incompleteness. The second research
issue concerns what type of debt governments should issue and in what proportion. In a seminal
contribution, Angeletos (2002) outlines what we refer to as a complete market approach to debt
management. Under the assumption of a Ramsey planner, who seeks to minimize the deadweight
loss arising from distortionary taxation, Angeletos shows i) even if a government only issues non-
contingent bonds it can still exploit ﬂuctuations in the yield curve and achieve the complete market
outcome and ii) the optimal structure for government debt can be solved for by choosing the
maturity structure that supports the complete market allocation for ﬁscal policy. Using this theory
of debt management, and in the case of government expenditure shocks only, Angeletos shows that
it is optimal for governments to issue long term debt and invest in short term assets.
Many have interpreted this result as saying that the complete market approach to debt man-
agement is the correct paradigm to study issues of debt management. The idea that the optimal
portfolio involves the government issuing long maturities is also becoming inﬂuential in the liter-
ature and receives further support in Barro (1999) and (2003) and Nosbusch (2008). The latter
also puts the theory to work and shows how cost minimization may be incompatible with optimal
ﬁscal policy. In our view the complete markets approach is a useful place to start research on these
issues but it has signiﬁcant problems.
As has already been documented by Buera and Nicolini (2004) the magnitude of the positions
derived from this complete market approach are extremely large multiples of GDP, in many cases
3the government should hold 5 or 6 times GDP in privately issued short bonds and issue similar
amounts of long bonds. No government in the real world conducts debt management this way,
not even approximately: governments rarely hold private bonds1 and the positions held at each
maturity are substantially smaller. Logically this gap between the large positions recommended
by the models in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) (henceforth ABN) and those
observed in practice could be due to a) preferences and technology in reality being diﬀerent from
the relatively simple endowment model of these papers b) market imperfections matter, especially
ﬁnancial market frictions c) governments do not know exactly the value of some parameters in
the economy d) governments may pursue suboptimal policies or be subject to other constraints
such as time consistency, etc. Angeletos (2002) suggests that a) is a likely candidate for explaining
away the gap2 but suggests that the qualitative implications of complete markets (to issue long
term debt and buy short term bonds) are robust to variations in preferences and technology. Our
view is diﬀerent - we believe that the large positions predicted by this method are a result of not
explicitly including the reasons for market incompleteness in the government’s optimal taxation
problem. In other words that b) and c) are more likely explanations for the discrepancy between
the predictions of the complete market approach and the data3. We believe that a failure to
explicitly incorporate these features into the government’s debt management problem may lead to
misleading recommendations.
In developing this argument we begin by showing that a) is unlikely to be the reason for the
discrepancy. For this purpose we ﬁrst extend the endowment model of ABN (which we summarise
in Section 2) to the case of capital accumulation (Section 3). We ﬁnd that far from reducing the
size of the debt positions the introduction of capital accumulation only exacerbates this problem -
positions become even larger but also become very volatile.In an eﬀort to reduce the size of these
positions we explore other ways of using a) to close the gap between model predictions and data.
Speciﬁcally in Section 4 we introduce habits, which Wachter (2006) uses to explain volatility in the
yield curve. The size of positions remains large, although they are reduced, and again the optimal
positions show substantial volatility and frequently reverse sign. The root cause of these problems
1Of course, the governments’ portfolios during the current crisis are a counterexample, as many governments have
lent extensively to banks. However it is doubtful that the motivation behind these loans is ﬁscal insurance and
governments seem committed to unwinding these positions as soon as possible.
2”However, this disturbing result [of debt holdings exploding to plus and minus inﬁnity] is mostly an artefact of an
economy without capital”
3We do not explore in this paper the possibility that it is non-Ramsey behaviour that explains the discrepancy.
Battaglini and Coate (2008) is a promising direction for such research whereas we wish to focus on the importance
of also speciﬁying market imperfections.
4is that the recommended portfolio positions show extreme sensitivity to variations in both the
speciﬁcation of the model and values of the relevant state variables.
Our analysis shows how this extreme sensitivity causes profound problems for the complete
market approach. Firstly this sensitivity makes the recommended positions not only very large but
also counterfactually volatile. Secondly the sensitvity is so great that the qualitative implications
stressed by Barro (1999), (2003), Angeletos (2002) and Nosbusch (2008) are not robust. Small
variations even in the choice of maturities available to the governments for a given speciﬁcation
of the economy can easily reverse the issue long-buy short recommendation. Introducing habits
and capital accumulation introduces additional state variables that result in the issue long-buy
short conclusion being reversed from period to period. Adding productivity to expenditure shocks
also can easily produce the implication that governments issue more short term than long term
debt. The sensitivity of the complete market approach is what leads to recommendations of large
asset positions, substantial volatility anda lack of qualitative robustness regarding the sign of the
positions at each maturity.
At the heart of the complete market approach to debt management is a dominant role for
ﬁscal insurance - issuing bonds in a manner that exploits the covariance of bond returns with
ﬂuctuations in the net present value of future primary surpluses so as to minimise tax volatility. It
is this dominant role for ﬁscal insurance alone that produces the excess sensitivity of debt positions.
However without any explicit consideration of transaction costs or robustness issues such sensitivity
is not necessarily a problem. This then raises the issue of how sensitive the optimality of these
positions is to small deviations from the complete market approach. This motivates our analysis
in Section 5 where we introduce speciﬁc reasons why markets may be incomplete and examine
whether the large and volatile positions recommended by the complete market approach are costly
in this setting. Firstly we consider the case when governments misspecify various features of the
economy (the persistence of shocks, the number of shocks, the discount rate, etc). The sensitivity
of debt positions to the speciﬁcation of the model is such that even for small misperceptions,
following the complete market approach can lead to signiﬁcant welfare losses. We ﬁnd these losses
are suﬃciently large that the government would frequently prefer to run a balanced budget and
so completely forego the advantages of tax smoothing in order to avoid the costs of incorrect debt
management. Further so great is the sensitivity that no robust debt management policies emerge
- which maturities perform best depends entirely on the misspeciﬁcation. The importance of this
example is that in misspecifying the economy the government is eﬀecitvely in an incomplete market
setting - it cannot achieve the complete market outcome. In other words when one is explicit about
5the reasons for market incompleteness the complete market approach is no longer optimal and
ﬁscal insurance and tax smoothing concerns disappear. This point is reinforced when we introduce
another explicit form of market incompleteness - transaction costs. For minimal levels of transaction
costs we ﬁnd that the government would once more prefer to operate a balanced budget rather than
the debt management policies recommended by the complete market approach.
We conclude that a theory of optimal debt management needs to supplement the focus of provid-
ing insurance against ﬁscal shocks with an explicit recognition of the capital market imperfections
- such as transaction costs, short selling constraints and liquidity eﬀects that generate the bond
market incompleteness in the ﬁrst place. In Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2009) we show explicitly
how to solve for optimal debt management in the face of market incompleteness. However the focus
in this present paper is in showing that whilst the complete market approach appears an attractive
way of sidestepping problems of market incompleteness explicit consideration of market frictions is
needed to reduce the counterfactual sensitivity it implies. Whilst the main message of our paper
is to show the problems caused by this sensitivity on a technical note an additional contribution is
to show how to solve for the complete markets approach with capital and habits. Extending the
model in this way introduces a number of non-trivial technical issues since the level of bonds is
now time-varying. We characterize recursively these positions adapting some results in Marcet and
Scott (2009). Further, the model solution for the model with habits is non-standard in a way that,
to our knowledge, has not been recognized before.
2 Complete Market Approach to Debt Management
This section essentially outlines the model and results of Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini
(2004), henceforth ABN. In later sections we extend and evaluate this model. In other words we
consider in this section a complete market approach to debt management. We examine the full
commitment model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) augmented to include a productivity shock and
calibrated on US data.
2.1 The Economy
The economy produces a single good that cannot be stored. The agent is endowed with one unit
of time that it allocates between leisure and labour. Technology for every period t is given by:
ct + gt ≤ θt (1 − xt), (1)
6where xt,ct and gt represent leisure, private consumption and government expenditure respectively
and θt represents a productivity shock. We shall refer to this version of our model, with some abuse
of terminology, as "the endowment economy"4.
We assume ht ≡ (gt,θt) are stochastic and exogenous and represent the only sources of uncer-
tainty in the model. In every period there is a ﬁnite number, N, of possible realizations of these
shocks hn ≡ (gn,θn), n = 1,...,N. As usual, ht = (h0,h1,...,ht) represents the history of shocks up
to and including period t. Governments and consumers have full information, that is, all variables
dated t are restricted to be measurable with respect to ht. As is standard, we will suppress the
dependence of the endogenous variables on ht whenever there is no confusion.




βt [U (ct) + V (xt)], (2)
where 0 < β < 1. For simplicity we assume U and V are strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave in their respective arguments. The government has two instruments to ﬁnance government
expenditure - a ﬂat tax on labour or issue debt/lend to the consumer.
The case of complete markets using Arrow securities requires the government to issue N distinct
contingent bonds at time t, each paying one unit of consumption contingent on ht+1 = hn for




denotes the amount of government bonds issued in period t
that pay one unit of consumption in period t + 1 if ht+1 = hn if realization ht occurred.













































is the tax on labour and wt
￿
ht￿
is the wage earned by the consumer.






























Both the government and the consumer are subject to No-Madoﬀ-game conditions.
Let c denote the sequence of all consumptions {c0,c1,...}, and similarly for all other variables.
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as a feasible allocation (c,x,g), a price system (w,q) and a
4Strictly speaking this is an endowment economy augmented with work eﬀort, a Robinson Crusoe economy.
7government policy (g,τx,b) such that, given the price system and government policy, (c,x) solves
the ﬁrm’s and consumer’s maximization problem and also satisﬁes the sequence of government
budget constraints (4).
The optimal Ramsey problem chooses policy by selecting the competitive equilibrium that
maximizes (2). As shown, for example, in Chari and Kehoe (1999), this is equivalent to maximizing




βt [ctUc,t − (1 − xt)Vx,t] = b−1Uc,0, (5)
where b−1 is the amount of liabilities inherited by the government in period 0, Uc is the marginal
utility of consumption and Vx is the marginal utility of leisure.
2.2 The Complete Markets Approach to Debt Management
Under the assumption of complete markets it is always possible to back out the optimal bond







[ct+s Uc,t+s − (1 − xt+s) Vx,t+s]




It can be shown that all government budget constraints are satisﬁed with the given sequence c,x if











Assume by contrast that the government can only issue bonds that yield non-contingent payoﬀs
at diﬀerent maturities. ABN show how to use {z} to derive the optimal structure of government
debt in this case. We call this the complete markets approach to debt management even though it
is applied to the case of bonds with a non-contingent payoﬀ.
We assume for now that the number of these maturities equals N (that is the number of possible
realizations of the shocks) e.g the government completes the markets. Let b
j
t denote the amount of
government bonds issued that pay one unit of consumption with certainty in period t + j, and let
p
j





function of ht. Assume the maturities are consecutive, that is, there is a bond maturing for each
8j = 1,...,N. Moreover, assume that in every period the government buys back the entire stock of

















for all t and ht, and symmetrically for the consumer, where p0






ABN prove that if bond prices are suﬃciently variable, then one can choose each period a
portfolio of maturities (b1
t,...,bN














almost surely, for all t. This can be done because even though bonds issued in t − 1 are not














state contingent due to the fact that bond prices vary with the state of nature ht.
Consider the special case in which productivity is constant θt = ¯ θ and government expenditure
follows a two step Markov process taking values gH > gL > 0 with probabilities of remaining in the
same state πHH and πLL. If b
j
−1 = 0 for j = 1,2 then it is well known that variables dated t in the
Ramsey allocation depend only on the shock gt. Therefore in the Ramsey equilibrium, consumption,










≡ pi and so on for i = H,L and for all t. Assuming in addition that g0 = gH it turns









= zi for i = H,L ∀t (11)




























for all t. Therefore in this case the amount of debt issued at each maturity is time invariant and
assuming standard utility functions, we have pH < pL so that B2 > 0 and B1 < 0. In other words,
the optimal debt management policy is for the government to hold short term assets and issue long
term liabilities
92.3 Simulations
As stressed by ABN the one-period ahead variability of long rates
￿
pH − pL￿
is not large (both in
canonical DSGE models and the real world) so that (12) implies large positions in B2 are needed
to achieve the complete market outcome and a matching but oﬀsetting large position in B1. To











and set β = 0.98, γ1 = 15 and γ1 = 2. We set η such that the government’s deﬁcit equals
zero in the non stochastic steady state and use the steady state condition to ﬁx the fraction of
leisure at 30% of the time endowment. We assume b−1 = 0. We borrow Chari’s et al. (1991)
calibration of the government spending and the technological processes, which they choose to
match the average share of government spending, the variance and serial correlation of consumption
growth in the US. Assuming a two state symmetric Markov process for government expenditure
we have gi = g∗ (1 + ξi), i = H,L and ξH = 0.07 = −ξL, g∗ equals to 25% of GDP in the non




LL = 0.95. For the technological
process we assume θi = exp(φi), i = H,L and φH = 0.04 = −φL. The transition probabilities of the
symmetric Markov process are πθ
HH = πθ
LL = 0.91. In the simulations we show also the case in which
the technological process is more persistent than government expenditure (πθ
HH = πθ
LL = 0.98).
To test the sensitivity of our debt management recommendations we consider a range of simu-
lations including both productivity and expenditure shocks, when only productivity or expenditure
is the source of uncertainty and also for diﬀerent degrees of persistence for the shocks. We show





= µ∆ + (1 − µ)I where ∆ are the calibrated





. When µ = 1 shocks have the persistence sug-
gested by Chari’s et al. (1991) calibration, when µ = 0 is shocks are i.i.d. and for µ ∈ (0,1) we have
intermediate levels of persistence. Critical to the size of the debt positions the complete market
approach recommends is the volatility of the yield curve so as we change the persistence of the
shocks we maintain the unconditional variance to the same calibrated level.
Table 1 reports our simulation results6. We quote the unconditional average of the ratio of the
5Assuming utility to be logarithmic helps simplify our analysis when we allow for capital accumulation. In this
case capital is taxed only in periods 0 and 1 and capital taxes are zero thereafter.
6Appendix A provides detailed description of the computational methods used to produce the simulations.
10value of debt positions with total output (in other words 7.50 means a position of 750% of GDP on
average). In the case with either only government expenditure or productivity shocks the economy
is characterized by only two states of the world and so the complete market outcome is attained by
issuing only two maturities. In the case where we have both productivity and expenditure shocks
we have four possible states of the world and so the complete market approach requires issuing
four diﬀerent maturities. We follow Buera and Nicolini (2004) and choose the maturities issued by
minimizing the absolute value of the debt positions.
INSERT TABLE 1
Focusing on only one source of uncertainty we ﬁnd the qualitative recommendations of Angeletos
(2002) hold - governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. In the case
of persistent government expenditure shocks the optimal positions are large multiples of GDP (the
long term debt issued is more than 7 times GDP). The required positions are large because with
persistent productivity shocks ﬂuctuations in the ﬁscal position (z) are large and, as shown in Table
1, ﬂuctuations in the long term interest rate are small. In the case of i.i.d. expenditure shocks or
only productivity shocks (whether they are i.i.d. or persistent) the optimal debt positions are much
smaller (although still substantially larger than the debt positions we see for OECD economies). It
is when we turn to the model that allows for both shocks that we see clearly the problems noted
by Buera and Nicolini (2004). Firstly, the required positions are enormous - the government needs
to issue debt at each maturity in amounts that vary between 400% and 16000% GDP. Secondly,
although the model still recommends issuing long term debt and investing in short term securities
the maturity structure is complex and varies dramatically with small changes in maturity. In the
case of intermediate persistence in shocks (µ = 0.33) the government should invest in one period
bonds, issue 2 year bonds worth 5900% of GDP and invest in three year bonds worth 16000% GDP.
The ﬁnal rows of Table 1 show simulation results for an economy with both shocks but where we
modify the calibrated parameters to allow for a productivity shock that is more persistent than the
government expenditure shock. We ﬁnd two other areas in which the predictions of the complete
market approach are volatile and non-robust. The ﬁrst is we can reverse the recommendation that
governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. Changing the persistence
of shocks aﬀects the slope of the yield curve and ﬂips around the size of the positions so that now the
government should issue short term debt and invest in long term assets. The reason is that whilst
interest rates still rise with adverse expenditure shocks the yield curve is now downward sloping,
as short rates are more responsive to temporary shocks than long rates in rational expectations
11models. The second sign of non-robustness occurs when we remove the option that the government
can change the maturities it issues. In particular, in the case of µ = 0.333 the maturity structure
that minimizes the absolute positions is 1,2,3 and 29 but if we restrict the government to issue
maturities at 1,4,13 and 30 (the maturities that minimize the debt positions in the case of persistent
shocks, µ = 1) then the matrix of returns becomes singular up to machine precision and the optimal
positions tend to plus and minus inﬁnity (numbers for this case, therefore, are not reported in Table
1). Therefore holding ﬁxed the maturity structure small changes in model speciﬁcation lead to huge
changes in positions.
Therefore in the case of an endowment economy calibrated to US data we ﬁnd that the complete
market approach to debt management i) recommends positions that are large multiples of GDP ii)
the size of debt positions varies sharply with small changes in maturity and involves simultaneously
both issuing and investing in bonds of adjacent maturities iii) is extremely sensitive to small changes
in parameter speciﬁcations with no presumption that it is always optimal for the government to
issue long term debt and invest in short term bonds7.
3 Introducing Capital Accumulation
The endowment economy is a useful workhorse model but the magnitude and sensitivity of the debt
positions we outlined in the previous section could be an artefact of its simplicity. Therefore in this
section we use the complete market optimal tax model of Chari et al (1994) to consider Angeletos’
(2002) claim that capital mitigates these problems.
3.1 Complete Markets
Assume there are two factors of production: labour (1 − x) and capital k, with output produced
through a Cobb Douglas function such that the economy’s resource constraint is :
ct + gt + kt − (1 − δ)kt−1 ≤ θt kα
t−1(1 − xt)1−α = θt F (kt−1,xt) (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate. As before, exogenous shocks are h = (g,θ). The government now
has three policy instruments to ﬁnance g: taxes on labour τx, taxes on capital τk and debt.
7We have focused purely on the properties of the debt structure implied by the complete market approach.
However, another source of mismatch with the data comes from the second order properties of deﬁcits and debt. As
shown in Marcet and Scott (2009) the complete market Ramsey outcome implies debt should show i) less persistence
than other variables and ii) a negative co-movement with deﬁcits. These ﬁndings are replicated in our simulations
here. However in practice debt shows greater persistence than other variables and a positive co-movement of deﬁcit
and debt.
12For this problem to be of interest it is standard to restrict capital taxes in two ways. First we
need to bound the initial period capital tax to prevent the planner from achieving the ﬁrst best
through a capital levy. We therefore add the constraint τk
0 ≤ τk for a ﬁxed constant τk. We also
need to assume that capital taxes are decided one period in advance (see also Farhi (2005)) otherwise
debt and taxes in equilibrium would be underdetermined and the role of debt management could
be supplanted by state contingent capital taxation (see Chari and Kehoe (1999)). Note that as a
result of this assumption we denote by τk
t the tax that is applied to capital income in period t even
though this tax is set with information on ht−1.
As before, we start with the case of complete markets where the government has full access to























































































where rt denotes the rental price of capital.
The set of constraints in the Ramsey problem is now augmented with the consumer’s Euler








rt+1 + 1 − δ
￿￿
. (14)
Firms’ maximization implies rt = Fk,t, wt = Fl,t.











Fk,0 + 1 − δ)k−1 + b−1
￿
plus the feasibility constraint (13) are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a competitive equilib-
rium.
13For given sequences c,k,x that satisfy these conditions we can build the expected discounted















− (1 − xt+s)
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Once more we can solve for the optimal portfolio by using (7) for each feasible c,k,x. However,
unlike the case for the endowment economy the optimal bond positions are no longer constant.







for all t ≥ 1 for some time-invariant function G. Using Proposition 1A in Marcet and Scott (2009)
this implies the existence of a time-invariant function D such that
D(kt−1,hn) = zk
t (ht−1,hn)
for all t ≥ 1, all ht all n and the zk
t obtained when plugging the optimal solution in (15). In
other words, even though zk
t (ht−1,hn) potentially depends on all past shocks these are eﬀectively
summarized by the previous period capital stock in the optimal solution. Therefore using (7) we
have that the Ramsey optimum for debt under complete markets is bt−1(ht−1,hn) = D(kt−1,hn).
The result of adding capital is that the contingent bond positions that complete the market are no
longer constant but are a function of the capital stock.
3.2 The Complete Market Approach to Debt Management
We now turn to the standard debt management case where the government issues debt that pays a
ﬁxed amount at the time of maturity. We assume the government issues N consecutive maturities.




























t (ht−1,hj) for N time-invariant functions Pn, for all t ≥ 1, all ht−1 and all n,j = 1,...,N, this























and assuming Π(kt) is an invertible matrix with probability one,8 then the time-invariant function






















 ≡ B(kt−1) (18)
gives the portfolio that eﬀectively completes the markets for all t ≥ 1, all ht.9 Therefore, with
capital accumulation the amount issued of maturity j at time t is no longer constant but is now a
time-invariant function of current capital.
The formula (18) already gives a strong hint that the resulting bond positions are likely to be
very volatile positions. This is because, as can be seen from the deﬁnition of Π(k) in (17), each row
of Π(k) contains the yield curve conditional on each realization of the shock. Roughly speaking,
the yield curve between period t and period t + 1 jumps from one row to another row in Π(k). As
is well known, both in the model and in the real world the yield curve does not change much from
one period to the next, therefore for any realistic calibration the rows of Π(k) are quite similar
and, as a consequence, the matrix Π(k) is likely to be nearly singular. Near singularity means that
small changes in k are likely to bring about large changes in [Π(k)]
−1, since this inverse is nearly
ill-deﬁned. When capital moves through time Π(k) moves around this singularity, and the bond
positions which depend on [Π(kt−1)]
−1 are likely to have very large movements through time.
3.3 Simulations
Table 2 summarizes the results for simulations of the model with capital accumulation. We set
α = 0.4, the depreciation rate δ = 0.05, assume that the initial value of government debt is always
zero and set the initial capital stock equal to its deterministic steady state value in the Ramsey
8The “probability” statement is with respect to the distribution on kt induced by the Ramsey solution. If Π(kt)
is singular with positive probability then, quite simply, the complete markets approach can not be implemented with
N maturities.
9Notice that the Ramsey solution is only fully recursive for t ≥ 1, because variables such as consumption or
capital are only time-invariant functions after period 1, but the portfolio that completes the markets turns out to be
time-invariant for t ≥ 0.
15allocation10. As the bond holdings issued in each period are no longer constant we report both
the average structure of the value of debt and also the average of the 5% lowest and 5% highest
positions for each maturity, so as to indicate the volatility of the positions. The details of how
we obtain the simulations for this and all the models solved in this paper are given in appendix
A. This appendix gives a step-by-step account of how each policy function is computed and how
the discounted budget constraints are insured. In summary, we ﬁnd an optimal policy G and the
expected discounted sum D such the FOC optimality conditions are satisﬁed. Functions G and D
are found by standard Parameterrized Expectation Algorithm (PEA). Given G we then ﬁnd P by
approximationg the expectations of future marginal utilities in one step and construct Π.
INSERT TABLE 2
The results show that adding capital accumulation only exacerbates the magnitude of the po-
sitions. When we allow for capital accumulation we allow another margin through which agents
can smooth consumption and so interest rates and bond prices are less volatile requiring larger
positions to achieve the complete market outcome. As we explained above capital accumulation
also makes the optimal debt positions time varying and Table 2 shows that the required variation
is substantial. For instance, in the case of persistent productivity and expenditure shocks although
on average the government issues long term debt worth 3344% of GDP in 5% of the periods it issues
long term debt worth on average around 1594% GDP and at the other extreme in 5% of periods
issuance averages around 6629%.
We also ﬁnd another dimension in which the qualitative recommendation of the complete mar-
kets approach to debt management is undermined. Let us go back to the case where the economy
is perturbed only by a persistent productivity shock and then use the complete market approach to
solve for the optimal debt positions when the government issues a one period bond and a j-period
bond, j = 2,...,30. Any one of these j’s is suﬃcient to complete the market given in this case
there are only two shocks. The optimal bond positions are shown in Figure 1 as a function of each
possible j. For j < 18 the government should issue short term debt and invest in long term bonds.
However when the government is constrained to issue long term bonds of maturity 18 or greater
than the result ﬂips around and now issuing long term debt and investing short term becomes opti-
mal. The notion that optimal portfolio structure can change so dramatically depending on whether
10More precisely, we consider the deterministic steady state when gt,θt are equal to the constants g
∗,θ
∗, there are
no capital taxes and labour taxes are constant.
16the government issues a 17 or 18 year bond seems both an undesirable property and worrying from
a policy perspective11.
Further evidence of the sensitivity of the model to small changes in speciﬁcation is shown in
Figure 2 which plots the policy function for the case where the government has access to markets
for 1-period and 16-period bond. Figure 2 shows that there is a value of capital k∗ close to 1291
such that, if kt < k∗ the government should issue short term debt and invest in long term assets,
and these signs are reversed for kt > k∗. Furthermore, long bonds converge to plus (minus) inﬁnity
if kt ￿ k∗ (kt ￿ k∗). The reason for this policy function is that the matrix of bond returns Π(k∗)
is non-invertible. More precisely, we see from (18) that if the shock takes only two values
b16





It turns out that the denominator in the above expression is zero at kt−1 = k∗, negative (positive)
for lower (higher) kt−1. The numerator, however, is never close to zero. This singularity is the
reason for the change in sign and the asymptotes in Figure 2. In our simulations the probability
of capital being less than k∗ in the steady state distribution is 49.8%, hence the singularity occurs
at a level of capital close to the median. Therefore, the probability of seeing an asset position that
changes dramatically from one period to the next in a given realization is very high and the time
series volatility of bond positions is very large. Note that a country that persisted every period in
issuing long term debt and investing in short term bonds would actually lead to excess volatility in
taxes. In other words, far from conﬁrming the qualitative insights of Angeletos (2002) the addition
of capital accumulation signiﬁcantly undermines the recommendation to always issue long and buy
short12.
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2
4 Habits and Term Structure Volatility
In this section we introduce habits into the utility function of the consumer. We have two purposes
in mind. First we want to study the robustness of the complete markets approach to this commonly
11Given that emerging markets often only have access to bonds of less than 10 year maturity Figure 1 suggests that
the complete market recommendation for emerging markets is the reverse of that to OECD economies. Emerging
markets should issue short and buy long.
12If we pursue the theme of emerging markets the implication of Figure 2 is that countries should pursue the
opposite of Angeletos recommendation e.g they should issue short and invest long, along their development path but
as they approach their steady state debt management will show dramatic reversals from period to period.
17used utility function. Habits have been widely used as a means of matching asset market puzzles
in the literature e.g. Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Wachter (2006). In
essence it makes interest rates a function of consumption growth and so the slope of the yield curve
depends on the rate of change of consumption growth and so raises the volatility of both. Second
and, perhaps more importantly, is to use the model with habits to match relevant aspects of the
volatility of the yield curve.
Relating the model to the volatility of the yield curve is important because one potential crit-
icism of our ﬁndings of extreme, volatile and unstable positions in Sections 2 and 3 is that they
are based around models which produce counterfactually low volatility in the slope of the yield
curve. To understand the importance of the volatility of the yield curve to the size of the positions
recommended by the complete market approach consider again the simple model of Section 2 when
g can take two possible values gH,gL and assume the government issues a short bond that matures










t−1 = zi for i = H,L for all ht−1
where p
S−1,H
t is shorthand for pS−1
t (ht−1,gH) and so on. Using the complete market methodology

























t ] then ceteris paribus
the larger is the absolute value of bM














t is the interest rate spread between long and short bonds for realizations











t ) are closely related to the variability of the
spread and the return on an M period bond conditional on information up to t−113. Therefore the
greater the volatility of the spread conditional on past information, and the larger the one period
ahead volatility of the return on the M period bond, the smaller the required optimal position
13More precisely, in the case of a symmetric distribution where Probt−1(gt = g
i) = .5 it is easy to check that





18to complete the market. Introducing habits is therefore an important way of changing the model
speciﬁcation to reduce the size of positions recommended by the complete market approach.




βt [U (ct,ct−1) + V (xt)], (19)
The resource and budget constraints are the same as in the endowment model developed in Section











The marginal utility now depends on past, current and expected future levels of consumption
because of the presence of internal habits. The implementability condition is (5) as in section 2
but with Uc,t given by the above formula.
The presence of future variables in Uc,t introduces some technical diﬃculties and non-standard
aspects in the optimal policy. Unlike the case of section 2 the ﬁrst order conditions of the Ramsey
policy include some intertemporal terms since ct now appears in Uc,t,Uc,t−1 and Uc,t+1. Further
in order to write recursively the problem we need to operate on the implementability constraint
until we can express the Lagrangian as a recursive sum from period 1 onwards. It turns out that
the policy function is time-invariant ct = G(ht,ct−1) for t ≥ 1, but it is a diﬀerent function in
period zero.14 This diﬀerent policy in period zero is usually avoided in endowment models by
assuming zero initial debt, our point is that even with zero initial debt the policy function in t = 0
is diﬀerent. To our knowledge these issues had not been dealt with in the literature, they are all
carefully addressed in the appendix.
In the appendix we also discuss how to compute the policy function G (obviously diﬀerent from
the function in the previous section) and how to separately compute the solution for period 0.







for some time-invariant function B and all ht for all t ≥ 1. Thus, the level and composition of debt
that eﬀectively complete the markets now varies with current consumption. The formula for B is
14Some of these technical diﬃculties would be avoided by assuming external habits. There is a literature that studies
how optimal ﬁscal policy can be used to treat the externality that arises from the spillovers of others’ consumption
caused by the external habits. See, for example, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Alonso-Carrera, Caballé and Raurich
(2004) and references therein. We chose internal habits to avoid dealing with issues of externalities.
19obtained, analogous to the model for capital, by constructing a matrix Π(ct) with the yield curve
for each realization in each row and inverting this matrix for each ct.
In our simulations we assume the functional form










The additional parameter introduced is χ and we can choose this so that our model matches
key features of the data. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there does not exist a full general
equilibrium model with habits which adequately captures the stochastic features of the yield curve
at all maturities. Motivated by the analysis above we therefore focus instead on matching the
volatility of the spread and the M period return only. To do so we estimate the one step ahead
forecast error variance of xt = sprt + 9r10
t (where the spread is that between the ten and one year
US bond) over the period 1949 to 2004. Applying standard model selection criteria on a VAR of
lags and a set of related macroeconomic variables (e.g. GDP growth, interest rates, primary deﬁcit,
inﬂation) yields an equation of the form
xt = α1 + α2xt−1 + α3πt + +α4πt−1 + εt




3.38. Comparing this to our model simulations of the previous sections conﬁrms how poorly they
perform in terms of producing volatility in the yield curve. For instance, in the model without
capital the conditional volatility of the spread between one and 10 period bonds, is equal to only
0.052 for the model with government spending shocks, 0.317 for the model with technology shocks
and only 1.172 even if we allow for both shocks. As we show below, in the case of habits, no capital
and productivity shocks alone we are able to match exactly the volatility of xt although for the
case of expenditure shocks only or both expenditure and productivity shocks we once again fail to
match fully the volatility. For these cases we therefore calibrate our model diﬀerently and focus on
matching just the volatility of the spread between the ten year and one year rate. A similar model
selection procedure as that described above gives a forecasting equation of the form :
sprt = α1 + α2sprt−1 + α3
deft−2
gdpt−2
+ α4rt−2 + ut
where
deft
gdpt is the primary deﬁcit/GDP ratio and rt is the one year real interest rate. The variance
of u is our measure of vart−1 (sprt) which leads to an estimate of
√
E(vart−1(ut))
Ert equal to 0.341
20(comparing this with our model simulations gives 0.03, 0.044 and 0.163 for the case of no habits
and just g shocks, productivity shocks and both expenditure and productivity shocks).
INSERT TABLE 3
Table 3 summarizes the results of our simulations using the calibrated values of χ and also
comparing with the case χ = 0. In order to maximize the volatility of interest rates we only show
results for persistent shocks. Because the introduction of habits raises the volatility of the interest
rate spread it does lower the magnitude of the positions. However, although the magnitude of
positions is reduced they remain large (for instance in the case with both shocks the government
has to issue 22 year bonds to the value of 11.48 times GDP and invest in 10 year bonds worth
18.23 times GDP). Whilst allowing for habits attenuates the size of the required positions it also
creates a substantial additional problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates and the term
spread reduces the average size of the positions but at the expense of substantially increasing their
volatility. For instance, if we focus on the higher 5% realizations of the long bond issuance they
are on average 99.10 times GDP, while if we focus on the lowest 5% realizations we ﬁnd that the
government invests in 22 year bonds to the value of 62.69 GDP on average in this interval. Therefore
the complete market approach recommends hugely volatile positions and, once again, the simple
qualitative recommendation of issuing long term bonds and investing in short term assets is easily
overturned since the government invests heavily in long maturities in many periods.
The reason behind these results is shown in Figure 3 which reports the policy functions for the
value of the bond positions as a function of consumption.15 The policy functions for bonds of 10, 15
and 22 period maturity show a spike at the same level of consumption. At this level of consumption
the matrix of returns is non-invertible and at this point the sign of the bond holding switches. The
reason for this behavior is analogous to the one described for the model with capital, namely, the
singularity of the matrix Π(ct) for some value of consumption. Therefore for only small changes
in consumption we see an enormous shift in debt positions with long term debt going from large
negative values to large positive ones. This reversal of optimal debt management occurs despite
the fact that interest rates do rise in response to adverse expenditure shocks - a combination that
Angeletos (2002) and others stress as important for making it optimal for governments to issue
long term debt.
15Four lines appear in each graph of Figure 3, each line for each current realization of the shocks. This may seem
odd given our previous observation that the position of the bonds is determined by current consumption. But what is
reported in the Figure is the value of the bond, which is multiplied by the price and, therefore, contingent on today’s
realization of the shocks.
21As stated earlier our model does not fully capture all aspects of the yield curve. Therefore it
could be argued that when a proper general equilibrium model of the term structure is developed the
complete market approach would predict positions that better match with the observed practice of
debt management. However this section suggests that even if a more volatile term structure would
help produce more modest positions it would only worsen the ﬁt in another dimension. Greater
term structure volatility reduces the size of the positions but substantially increases their volatility.
INSERT FIGURE 3
5 Robustness
Previous sections have shown how the positions the complete market approach advocates are ex-
treme and “unreasonable” when compared with actual debt management practice. For instance,
we have shown how the complete market approach leads to positions which are large multiples of
GDP and which in the presence of habits or capital accumulation show high volatility. We have
also shown how variations in the parameterisations of the economy lead to substantial changes in
the optimal portfolio structure such that there is no presumption that it is optimal to issue long
term debt and invest in short term assets. However within the context of the framework we have
been using the size, sensitivity and volatility of the bond positions cannot be used as a criticism of
the complete market approach - given the planner’s knowledge of the environment and the absence
of transaction costs these are the optimal positions. Pointing to extreme magnitudes or volatility
cannot be a justiﬁed criticism unless these positions come with some cost. It is to this topic we
now turn.
In this section we extend our analysis to consider how robust these portfolios are to alternative
speciﬁcations. Firstly we focus on the case where the government incorrectly speciﬁes the nature of
the economy (variously the persistence of shocks, the number of states of the world and the discount
rate). We show how relatively small misspeciﬁcations can lead to large welfare costs in pursuing
the complete market recommendations such that governments are often better pursuing a balanced
budget outcome. Secondly we consider the size of transaction costs necessary to oﬀset the insurance
beneﬁts of the complete market approach to debt management. We show how given the size of the
positions the complete market approach advocates even de minimus transaction costs make these
inferior to a balanced budget approach. Introducing model misspeciﬁcation and transaction costs
means we are in a world of incomplete markets. It is hardly surprising therefore that welfare falls
relative to the ﬁrst best complete market outcome. However the point of this section is not to note
22that welfare falls but that the potential costs are so large that governments would frequently prefer
to run a balanced budget and forego any form of debt management. In other words once market
incompleteness is introduced explicitly into the model the complete market approach is far from
optimal and not even an approximate guide for policy.
5.1 Government Misperceptions
Key to the size of the positions that the complete market approach recommends is the persistence
of the shocks. Errors in perceiving persistence of shocks will therefore translate into sub-optimal
portfolio positions and given the sensitivity of positions there is potential for these errors to be




where Wi denotes the welfare level obtained for an economy where i = CM,BB and X and
CM denotes the complete market approach when the government correctly speciﬁes the economy,
BB is when the government runs a balanced budget every period and X is an economy in which the
government believes that the primitives of the economy are given by vector ρ whereas in practice
they are given by ρ. The ratio R(.,.) captures the proportion of the gains of optimal debt issuance
that are preserved when the government misperceives the economy. The denominator measures
the maximal welfare gains that come from issuing debt and so R(.,.) is bounded from above by
1. For values of R(.,.) between 0 and 1 the misspeciﬁcation of the primitives reduces the welfare
gains from debt management but still leads to an improvement over the balanced budget case. In
the case when R(.,.) < 0 then attempts at optimal debt management are actually producing worse
outcomes than a balanced budget and no debt issuance.
In constructing this measure we are eﬀectively using the balanced budget case as a bench-
mark.Another possible benchmark would be incomplete markets when the government can only
issue one period bonds e.g Marcet and Scott (2009). In this case the question of how much debt
to issue and at what maturities become one and the same thing. However we prefer to use the
balanced budget outcome as a benchmark. Given that it must be the case that WIM,1 (the welfare
reached under incomplete markets with just one period debt) must exceed WBB then negative
values of R(.,.) are less likely using balanced budgets as a benchmark. In other words we are giving
complete markets a better chance. Using WBB rather than WIM,1 also makes the numerator and
denominator larger and reduces the sensitvity of R(.,.) and also avoids possible approximation
23errors given we cannot solve exaclty for the incomplete market case.
5.1.1 Misperceiving Persistence
Consider the earlier model of Section 2.3 of an economy without capital accumulation and subject
only to government expenditure shocks. Government expenditure can take only two values, high























LL. . Assuming the government can issue only one year and thirty year bonds we
show in Figure 4a how R(π,￿ π) varies as beliefs alter with respect to reality. So long as governments
underestimate the persistence of the process R(.,.) is always postive even if less than 1. The worse
the underestimate of persistence the more that R(.,.) tends to the balanced budget benchmark.
However in the case that the government overestimates persitence (and so takes larger positions)
then R(.,.) drops rapidly and quickly turns negative and takes substantial values. Governments are
better following a balanced budget than operating complete market policies when they overestimate
the persistence of government expenditure shocks. Figure 4b shows the same experiment but around




LL = 0.5. The same pattern emerges - underestimating persistence
leads to welfare declines relative to the true complete market outcome but the costs increase only
slowly with the level of underestimation. However once again the welfare costs increase dramatically
in the case of overpersistence and lead to even greater losses than Figure 4a.
INSERT FIGURE 4A AND 4B
As the precise positions recommended by the complete market approach are very sensitive to
the choice of maturities the government issues so too will be the welfare losses. Table 4 investigates
this by calculating R(.,.) across all combinations of one year bonds with bonds of up to 30 years and




LL = 0.95 but govern-
ment beliefs diﬀer. The table suggests that our choice of one and thirty year bonds in Figure 4a was
ﬂattering to the complete market approach. Other maturities frequently lead to worse outcomes
than the balance budget case when the persistence of expenditure shocks is underestimated and
the losses are even greater in this direction than overestimating the persistence. Although issuing
thirty year bonds is rarely the way to maximise R(.,.) in the case of misperceptions it does seem
that issuing such long bonds is a more robust way of minimising the losses from underestimating
the persistence of shocks. It doesn’t however help against the costs of overestimating persistence.
24INSERT TABLE 4
To better understand the robustness of the complete market approach to model misspeciﬁcation
we perform the following exercise. We consider the optimal portfolios of one and thirty period debt
recommended by the complete market approach when the government thinks that the persistence
parameter is either 0.65, 0.75, 0.85 or 0.95 i.e four diﬀerent portfolios. In the case where the
government believes the persistence is 0.95 the optimal portfolio is to issue 30 period debt worth
701% of output and go short by 689% in one year bonds. The absolute size of the positions
is declining in the perceived persistence such that when the government thinks the persistence
parameter is 0.65 the positions are 112% and -110% respectively. We then calculate welfare for all
four portfolios but where the true persistence in the economy takes values between 0.1 and 0.9.
The results are shown in Figure 5. The results suggest that the balanced budget outcome is always









LL = 0.95 then a balanced budget dominates nearly
everywhere. The implication is that it is the size of the positions that leads to welfare losses from
misspeciﬁcation. Robustness consideratons would suggest reducing the magnitude of positions
advocated by complete markets.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
5.1.2 Misperceiving States of the World
The previous subsection focused on a minor deviation from complete markets. The government
still issued enough securities (2 - the number of states of the world) to achieve the complete market
outcome but because of misperceptions failed to do so. In this subsection we consider a more serious
failure - the government continues to issue 2 securities but there exist three states of the world. As
well as government expenditure taking on a high and a low value it can also with small probability
take on a very large value, gW(as would be the case with a war). Speciﬁcally we assume that the
economy is characterised by a transition matrix


π 1 − π 0
1 − π π − πW πW
0.05 0.9 0.05

 but the government





. Figure 6 shows the value
of R(.,.) as πW varies from 0 to 0.05. For even small values of πW there is a sharp fall in welfare
from the complete market outcome due to the fact that the government ignores the possibility of
25a third state such that it is often optmal to follow a balanced budget rather than the complete
market outcome.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
5.1.3 Misperceiving the Discount Rate
The size of positions recommended by the complete market approach will depend signiﬁcantly on
the perceived discount rate. In this section we show how errors here again lead to it being better
to use a balanced budget rather than issue debt. Consider the case where the agents discount rate
is β = 0.98 but the government has beliefs in the range (0.93,0.98). Figure 7 shows the welfare
performance across the various combinations. For the case of issuing a 1 and 30 period bonds
any incorrect beliefs over the discount factor lead to a worse outcome than a balanced budget.
This example also illustrates another non-robustness problem. We documented earlier that when
governments made mistakes about the persistence of shocks there was some evidence that issuing
long bonds was the most robust policy. However in the case of errors in the discount rate issuing
long bonds is usually worse than the balanced budget.
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
5.2 Transaction Costs
In this subsection we return once more to the model of earlier in which the government has perfect
knowledge but consider another problem with the size of the positions - transaction costs. In
Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2009) we show how to solve for optimal debt management under
incomplete markets in the presence of transaction costs (and other market imperfections). Here
however we oﬀer some simple calculations to show the size of the problem this represents for the
complete market approach. Assume the government pursues the complete market approach to debt
management even when markets are incomplete. We then calculate the level of transaction costs
that would make the government indiﬀerent between pursuing this approach or a balanced budget.
Speciﬁcally we solve the following problem:
26ct + gt + TC = 1 − xt











In the case of government expenditure shocks only then even miniscule level of transaction costs
equal to 0.016% of steady state government expenditure (or a level of transaction costs equal to
0.003% of the absolute value of debt issued) are suﬃcient for the government to prefer to run a
balanced budget than the complete market inspired optimal debt management. In the case of both
productivity and expenditure shocks then the level of transaction costs required to be indiﬀerent
with a balanced budget is 0.02% of steady state expenditure and 0.002% of the absolute value of
debt issued.
We have shown in this section through a series of examples how introducing market incom-
pleteness explicitly often produces outcomes where governments would rather avoid the insights
from the complete market approach. Indeed so profound is the problem of sensitivity and volatil-
ity that governments would prefer to forego the advantages of tax smoothing completely and run
a balanced budget. These results have a similar ﬂavour to those of Siu (2004) who considers a
Ramsey planner choosing optimal taxation in an economy characterised by non-state contingent
debt and sticky prices. In this case the government can use ﬂuctuations in unanticipated inﬂation
to achieve the complete market outcome given by (7) but has to trade this oﬀ against the welfare
costs of incorrect relative prices induced by sticky prices (see also Lustig, Sleet and Yeltekin (2009)
for an analysis of optimal portfolio structure in the case of nominal debt and sticky prices). Siu
(2004) ﬁnds that for a government expenditure process similar to the post-war US experience the
required inﬂation volatility is so great and the associated welfare costs so large governments ﬁnd it
optimal not to complete the market. Only if government expenditure experiences war time spikes,
essentially the fat tail model of Section 5.1.2, is it desirable to use inﬂation volatility to help achieve
ﬂuctuations in the market value of debt. Therefore completing the market requires extreme and
volatile behaviour in a variable (in his case inﬂation, in ours debt positions) and because of market
imperfections (for Siu sticky prices, in our case misperceptions or transaction costs) this volatility
27is sub-optimal.There are of course diﬀerences in our approaches. Siu focuses on an imperfection in
the goods market (sticky prices) whilst our focus is on imperfections in the bond market. Further
Siu is not about debt management as the government only ever issues one bond. Finally his results
show that in the presence of fat tails it is optimal ex post to alter inﬂation to minimise deadweight
loss whereas we ﬁnd in the presence of fat tails it is not optimal ex ante to issue large debt positions.
6 Conclusion
Macroeconomists have become increasingly interested in trying to embed policy recommendations
for debt management into theories of optimal ﬁscal policy This literature has produced an appealing
theory which we call the complete market approach to debt management. By exploiting variations
in the yield curve the government can structure its debt so as to minimize the distortionary costs to
taxation. Bond price movements help maintain the government’s intertemporal budget constraint
that requires equating the market value of government debt to the net present value of future
primary ﬁscal surpluses. Successful debt management enables this to happen whilst minimizing
changes to taxes. The great strength of this insight is that it can be applied even in the case
when bond markets are incomplete in the sense that the government cannot issue state-contingent
debt. Further a number of authors have argued that this complete market approach oﬀers a robust
qualitative recommendation to debt managers - governments should issue long term debt and invest
in short term bonds.
In this paper we have extensively reviewed the insights and implications of this complete market
approach to debt management and identify a number of areas where this methodology is problem-
atic:
i) As in Buera and Nicolini (2004) we ﬁnd that the magnitude of the debt positions the govern-
ment is required to hold are implausibly large multiples of GDP. We extend Buera and Nicolini’s
results by calibrating the model to US data and considering a range of extensions including capi-
tal accumulation and habits. Although the magnitude of the positions does change substantially
across these model speciﬁcations they remain throughout extremely large compared with observed
practice.
ii) We identify an additional problem when we extend the model to allow for capital accumula-
tion and habits. The required positions also show extremely large volatility. In particular increasing
the volatility of interest rates only partly alleviates the size of positions but introduces a problem
of extreme volatility. In some cases this volatility is so large that optimal positions for long term
28debt ﬂuctuate between large negative and positive positions from one period to the next.
iii) It could be argued that these defects are a result of using inevitably stylized models, that
the quantitative implications of the theory should not be taken too seriously, but that the quali-
tative features are robust. However we ﬁnd that this complete market approach is also extremely
sensitive to relatively small variations in parameters. Both the size and sign of positions can change
dramatically with small changes in relative persistence of shocks or slight changes in the maturity
of bonds that governments can issue. There may be good reasons why governments in the real
world should issue long term debt, but the complete market methodology is not what produces this
recommendation.
iv) We show that by introducing varying degrees of market incompleteness these large volatile
and unstable debt positions lead to sub-optimal outcomes. In particular, allowing for possible
model misspeciﬁcation or transaction costs we ﬁnd frequently that the government would prefer to
follow a balanced budget rather than implement the optimal portfolio structure recommended by
the complete market approach.
The fundamental problem of the complete market approach is that the limited volatility of the
yield curve makes maturities a poor substitute for state contingent debt. Therefore in order to
exploit the maturity structure of debt the complete market approach requires large positions. If
governments were to try and implement these policy recommendations they would have to buy
and sell enormous amounts of bonds each period. This would entail all kinds of transaction costs,
reﬁnancing risks, and it would force some private agents in the economy to hold the opposite of the
huge positions the government decided to take, possibly facing credit constraints. The government
would have to hold very large amounts of private debt which could be defaulted upon. By explic-
itly ignoring these features of market incompleteness we believe the complete market approach is
potentially misleading. The great strength of the complete market approach is it recognizes the
importance of debt management in providing insurance against ﬁscal shocks. However the weak-
ness with the complete market approach is it only focuses on ﬁscal insurance and abstracts from
fundamental features of market incompleteness. A successful theory of debt management will need
to balance the insights of ﬁscal insurance with the constraints that incomplete markets provide.
Whilst the complete market approach oﬀers many insights we do not think it can be used to justify
debt management policies or recommendations. We remain in search of a plausible theory of debt
management.
29APPENDIX A - Solution Details
Here we present the equations determining the equilibrium and we describe in detail the nu-
merical computations for each model analyzed. In all cases it was assumed that initial government
debt was zero, so we describe the solution procedure for this case, guaranteeing that there is no
diﬀerence between the policy function of period zero and all other periods.
Numerical solution of the endowment economy (Section 2)




βt{U (ct) + V (xt) + λ[Uc,tct − Vx,t (1 − xt)] (22)
+νt[θt (1 − xt) − ct − gt]}
The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem for all t are
Uc,t + λ(Ucc,tct + Uc,t) − νt = 0
Vx,t − λ(Vxx,t (1 − xt) − Vx,t) + νt = 0 (23)
θt (1 − xt) − ct − gt = 0
plus the implementability constraint (5).






For a given value of λ solving the model is trivial: for each period and each realization equations
(23) give three equations to ﬁnd the three unknowns ct,xt,νt as a (time-invariant) function of the
exogenous shocks θ,g. In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium λ we perform the following steps:
1. given the initial condition and the transition probabilities of the states, draw S series of T








. The number of series S should be large enough for a certain expectation
that we specify below to be computed accurately. T should be large enough for a certain
discounted sum that we describe below to be computed accurately.




to get N2 values of c, x and the
corresponding surplus;






t=1 we could approximate the dis-


















. This amounts to setting all surpluses
for t > T equal to zero, and we can do better than that. We can reduce the error from
truncating the sum by setting the surplus for t > T to the average value of the deﬁcit for





Uc,0 − (1 − x) V x
Uc,0
￿
where Uc,c,x and V x
are computed at the mean of the shocks.










































for S,T suﬃciently large. Notice that (24) is a function of λ.
4. Iterate on λ until (24) is close to zero. The result is the equilibrium λ
Given this equilibrium λ and values of c, x and of the surpluses, we compute the prices in all
the states of the bonds with diﬀerent maturities, computing the expectation on marginal utilities
as a simple sum over all possible future states.
We also can compute the z’s by a regression of the realized discounted sum on the exogenous
variables.




is the vector of bonds, P
(N2×N2)
is the matrix of the returns and z
(N2×1)
is the vector
of conditional expected discounted surpluses.
Numerical solution of the economy with capital (Section 3)
Even with zero initial debt the model with capital has a diﬀerent policy function in period
zero from the following periods. The reason is that the return to capital is in the right side of the
implementability constraint.
31Assuming τk




βt {U (ct) + V (xt) + λ[Uc,tct − Vx,t (1 − xt)]
+νt [F (kt−1,1 − xt,θt) + (1 − δ)kt−1 − ct − gt − kt]
−λ[b−1 + (Fk,0 + 1 − δ)k−1]Uc,0}
and the ﬁrst order conditions are:
for t > 0 :
Uc,t + λ(Ucc,tct + Uc,t) − νt = 0
Vx,t − λ(Vxx,t(1 − xt) − Vx,t) + νtFx,t = 0 (25)
νt − βEt [νt+1 (Fk,t+1 + 1 − δ)] = 0
F (kt−1,1 − xt,θt) + (1 − δ)kt−1 − ct − gt − kt = 0
for t = 0 :
Uc,0 + λ(Ucc,0c0 + Uc,0) − ν0 − λ[b−1 + (Fk,0 + 1 − δ)k−1]Ucc,0 = 0
Vx,0 − λ(Vxx,0 (1 − x0) − Vx,0) + ν0Fx,0 − λFkx,0k−1 = 0 (26)






1Fk,1 + 1 − δ
￿￿
= 0
F (k−1,1 − x0,θ0) + (1 − δ)k−1 − c0 − g0 − k0 = 0
We assume log utility and b−1 = 0.
The numerical procedure that we follow has step 1) as above. The following steps are now a
bit more involved:
1. guess a value for λ. Given results in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) the solution af-
ter period 1 is given by a time-invariant function of the state variables kt−1,gt,θt, so we
parameterize the function
Et [Uc,t+1 (Fk,t+1 + 1 − δ)] = Φ(β;kt−1,gt,θt), for t ≥ 1
where Φis a polynomial with parameters β.
322. Given the assumption of log utility the ﬁrst equation in (25) gives Uc,t = νt and the third
equation in (25) gives
Uc,t = Φ(β;kt−1,gt,θt)
Given Φ and a conjecture for β we draw a long realization (10000 periods) of the shocks
and we use system (25) to generate long run simulations for all variables and iterate on β
with PEA (den Haan and Marcet (1990)) to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point βf. In this way we ﬁnd an
approximation to the policy function for t > 0 consistent with λ.
3. period 0 is diﬀerent from the other periods. Now Uc,0 ￿= ν0. To ﬁnd the optimal choice
for period 0, guess a value for k0. For every value of g1,θ1 solve period 1 variables using
system (25) replacing E1 by the approximate function found in the previous step. Averaging
over all states for g1,θ1 compute E0 [ν1 (Fk,1 + 1 − δ)], E0 (Uc,1Fk,1), and E0 (Uc,1) consistent








, the level of capital tax that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
conditions of the consumer.





for the remaining periods, given the realization for (ct,xt,kt) from point














. This is used to reduce the error in truncating the inﬁnite sum as
in step 3 of the previous model.
5. short simulation: we draw 10000 realizations of the shocks for the ﬁrst 50 periods. We solve
(25) given k0 and we compute the inﬁnite sum of the expected surplus in period 0 as an average








βt [Uc,tct − Vx,t(1 − xt)] = [b−1 + (Fk,0 + 1 − δ)k−1]Uc,0
and we iterate on λ in a similar way as before, until this constraint is approximately satisﬁed.
33Given the equilibrium λ, Φ, βf and the realizations of (ct,xt,kt) of the long simulation of point
4), in order to get the bond prices at diﬀerent maturities (from 1 to 30 years), approximate the
expectations of future marginal utilities as a function of the current states of the economy.





+ [Uc,tct + Vx,t (1 − xt)](ht−1,gi,θj), the prices Π
are computed in a similar way, and (18) gives the equilibrium maturities for the one period bond
and diﬀerent maturities of the longer bonds.
Numerical solution of the economy with consumption habits (Section 4)
In the case of habits the Lagrangian of the Ramsey problem with zero initial debt is exactly
as in (22) replacing U (ct) by U (ct,ct−1) and with Uc,t given by (20). This means that in the
discounted sum of the Lagrangian future consumptions appear in the term dated t, so that in order
to formulate the model recursively we have to rearrange the Lagrangian





















βt {U (ct,ct−1) + V (xt) + λ [(U1,t + β U2,t+1) ct − Vx,t(1 − xt)]
+ νt[θt (1 − xt) − ct − gt]}




βt {U (ct,ct−1) + V (xt) + λ [U1,t ct + U2,t ct−1 − Vx,t (1 − xt)]
+ νt[θt (1 − xt) − ct − gt]}
where we used the notation in (27) and the the law of iterated expectations in the ﬁrst equality,
and for the last equality we set aside the t = 0 term and reorder.
Notice that the term multiplying λ is diﬀerent in period t = 0 as in future periods so that the
solution is only recursive after t > 0. This means that even with zero initial debt the policy function
is diﬀerent in the ﬁrst period, unlike the endowment model of section 2, but similar to the case
with capital. Notice also that ct−1 is the only variable from the past that appears in the terms
34dated t ≥ 1 so that this is a suﬃcient state variable. This implies that the optimal solution can
be written recursively as ct = G(ht,ct−1) for t > 0 but a diﬀerent decision function applies at time
zero.
The FOC for t > 0 are given by the following expression
(1 + λ)(U1,t + βEtU2,t+1) + λ[U11,tct + U12,t ct−1 + βEt (U12,t+1ct+1) + β ct EtU21,t+1] = νt
but the term U12,t ct−1 is absent for the FOC at t=0.
To take care of the diﬀerent ﬁrst order condition for period zero we compute c0 from an analog
to step 3 in the algorithm described for the model of section 3.
Notice that the above FOC imply that the expectations EtU2,t+1, Et (U12,t+1ct+1) and EtU21,t+1
need to be approximated in order to use this FOC to solve for ct. Given the functional form for U




EtU12,t+1 = χγ1 Et
￿
(ct+1 − χct)−γ1−1￿
Et (U12,t+1ct+1) = χγ1 Et
￿
ct+1(ct+1 − γct)−γ1−1￿






















Then we solve for a rational expectations equilibrium given λ, we compute the initial consumption
separately, check the value of the implementability constraint for each λ, and iterate on λ until the
implementability constraint is satisﬁed.
We build the elements of the system of equations that give the bonds at each maturity by
approximating the corresponding functions of future discounted deﬁcits and prices, for each value
of the state variable ct and for each possible future realization, now these functions have to depend
on past consumption.
35References
[1] Alonso-Carrera, J., Jordi Caballé and Xavier Raurich, "Consumption Externalities, Habit
Formation and Equilibrium Eﬃciency", Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(2), 231—251.
[2] Angeletos, G-M (2002) ”Fiscal policy with non-contingent debt and optimal maturity struc-
ture”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27, 1105-1131
[3] Barro, R.J (1999) ”Notes on optimal debt management” Journal of Applied Economics 2,
281-89
[4] Barro, R.J (2003) ”Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt” Annals of Economics
and Finance,4, 1-15
[5] Bohn, H (1990) "Tax Smoothing with Financial Instruments", American Economic Review,
80(5), 1217-30
[6] Buera F. and J.P. Nicolini (2004) ”Optimal Maturity of Government Debt with Incomplete
Markets”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, 531-554 .
[7] Campbell, J.Y and Cochrane, J (1999) ”By force of habit : a consumption based explanation
of aggregate stock market behaviour” Journal of Political Economy 107(2) 205-251
[8] Chari, V.V., Christiano, L.J. and Kehoe, P.J. (1991) ”Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy:
Some Recent Results”, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, vol 23, n. 3, part 2, 519-539.
[9] Chari, V.V., Christiano, L.J. and Kehoe, P.J. (1994) ”Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Business
Cycle Model”, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 617-652.
[10] Chari, V.V. and P. Kehoe (1999): ”Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy” in Handbook of
Macroeconomics, John Taylor and Mike Woodford, eds. (North Holland: Amsterdam).
[11] Constantinides, G.M (1990) ”Habit formation : a resolution of the equity premium puzzle”
Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990) 519-43
[12] den Haan, W. and Marcet, A. (1990) ”Solving the stochastic growth model by parameterizing
expectations”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 8, 31-34.
[13] Farhi, E (2005) "Capital taxation and Ownership when Markets are Incomplete", MIT mimeo
36[14] Faraglia, E, Marcet, A and Scott, A (2008) ”Fiscal Insurance and Debt Management in OECD
Economies”, Economic Journal Vol. 118, Issue 527, pp. 363-386
[15] Faraglia, E, Marcet, A and Scott, A (2009) "Optimal Debt Management Under Incomplete
Markets" London Business School mimeo
[16] Ljungqvist, L. and Uhlig, H. (2000), "Tax Policy and Aggregate Demand Management Under
Catching Up with the Joneses", American Economic Review 90, 356—366.
[17] Lucas, R.E. and Stokey, N.L. (1983) ”Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy
without Capital”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 55-93.
[18] Lustig, H, Sleet, C and Yeltkin, S (2009) "Fiscal hedging with nominal assets" Journal of
Monetary Economics 55, 710-727
[19] Marcet. A. and A. Scott (2009); ”Debt and Deﬁcit Fluctuations and the Structure of Bond
Markets”, Journal of Economic Theory 473-501.
[20] Missale, A. (1999) Public Debt Management, Oxford : Oxford University Press.
[21] Nosbusch, Y (2008) ”Interest Costs and the Optimal Maturity Structure of Government Debt”,
Economic Journal, 118, 477-498
[22] Scott, A. (2007) ”Optimal Taxation and OECD Labour Taxes”, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 54(3) 925-944
[23] Siu, H (2004) "Optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy with sticky prices" Journal of Monetary
Economics 51, 575-607
[24] Wachter, J.A (2006) "A consumption-based model of the term structure of interest rates"
Journal of Finance , 79, 365-399
37Table 1 : Simulation Results - Endowment economy
Shocks Interest rates
g H L
B1 B30 R1 2.23 1.85
µ = 1 -7.04 7.16 R30 2.10 1.98
B1 B30 R1 3.95 0.13
µ = 0 -0.79 0.81 R30 2.28 1.80
θ H L
B1 B30 R1 1.07 2.93
µ = 1 -0.85 0.90 R30 1.85 2.21
B1 B30 R1 -3.13 7.21
µ = 0 -0.17 0.18 R30 1.86 2.21
g,θ HH HL LH LL
B1 B4 B13 B30 R1 1.23 3.25 0.90 2.71
µ = 1 -16.15 41.32 -86.71 57.66 R30 1.92 2.28 1.79 2.15
π
g
HH = 0.95 B1 B2 B3 B29 R1 -5.75 7.21 -2.98 4.16
πθ
HH = 0.91 µ = 1/3 -4.22 58.48 -161.22 106.37 R29 1.92 2.28 1.79 2.14
B1 B5 B18 B30 R1 2.00 2.45 1.64 2.71
µ = 1 63.82 -140.94 163.15 -75.64 R30 1.97 2.22 1.85 2.09
π
g
HH = 0.95 B1 B2 B3 B29 R1 -3.34 6.96 -2.74 4.02
πθ
HH = 0.98 µ = 1/3 5.77 -85.8 210.19 -129.51 R29 1.91 2.28 1.79 2.14




µ = 1 -14.49 12.36 R1 2.08 1.98
E+5% -18.29 9.41 R30 2.07 2.00
E−5% -11.65 16.3
B1 B30
µ = 0 -9.23 7.19 R1 2.06 1.99




µ = 1 -8.49 6.26 R1 2.26 1.85
E+5% -12.5 3.56 R30 2.01 2.07
E−5% -5.62 10.10
B1 B30
µ = 0 -3.49 1.47 R1 2.01 2.07
E+5% -3.93 1.19 R30 2.02 2.06
E−5% -3.12 1.82
g,θ HH HL LH LL
B1 B4 B16 B30
µ = 1 -30.10 42.54 -48.18 33.44 R1 2.46 1.67 2.26 1.48
E+5% -34.33 26.14 -97.58 15.94 R30 2.03 2.07 1.94 1.98
E−5% -26.30 63.28 -16.46 66.29
π
g
H = 0.95 B1 B9 B13 B29
πθ
H = 0.91 µ = 1/3 -14.38 32.62 -30.74 10.42 R1 2.04 1.97 2.00 1.92
E+5% -18.80 26.24 -36.75 8.16 R29 2.01 2.05 2.00 2.03
E−5% -11.00 41.44 -25.37 11.91
B1 B5 B18 B30
µ = 1 -77.85 153.10 -207.77 130.19 R1 2.55 1.63 2.42 1.50
E+5% -109.15 138.74 -226.37 106.12 R30 2.09 2.05 2.02 1.99
E−5% -55.63 167.34 -189.63 161.17
π
g
H = 0.95 B1 B9 B14 B29
πθ
H = 0.98 µ = 1/3 -12.58 21.44 -23.13 12.20 R1 2.07 1.94 2.03 1.90
E+5% -34.93 13.46 -54.90 8.63 R29 2.03 2.00 2.05 2.01
E−5% -5.48 70.24 -18.56 17.44
39Note: The positions and the interest rates are obtained as average of 10000 period simulation. E±5%
denote the average conditional on the realization being among the highest or lowest 5% values of the bonds.
40Table 3: Simulation Results - with consumption habits
Shocks Habits Interest rates
θ H L
χ = 0 B1 B10 R1 1.07 2.93
µ = 1 -1.03 1.07 R10 1.58 2.47
χ = 0.273 B1 B10
µ = 1 -0.63 0.62 R1 -0.58 5.10
E+5% -0.68 0.59 R10 1.37 2.73
E−5% -0.58 0.66
g,θ HH HL LH LL
χ = 0 B1 B10 B16 B30 R1 1.23 3.15 0.90 2.71





HH = 0.91 χ = 0.25 B1 B10 B15 B22
µ = 1 -0.48 -18.23 7.01 11.48 R1 0.09 5.39 -0.77 3.50
E+5% -0.50 -27.45 -91.14 -62.69 R22 1.82 2.44 1.62 2.21
E−5% -0.45 -7.24 90.36 99.10
Note: idem as previous table. In the model with consumption habits and technology shocks χ is chosen
to match the one step ahead forecast error of the variable spreadt+9rr10
t where spreadt = rr10
t −rr1
t. In
the model with government spending and techology shocks χ is chosen to match the one spep ahead forecast
error of spreadt.
41Table 4:
￿ π max R R min R
0.99 -1.384 -3.319 -8.290
0.98 0.377 -0.067 -2.740
0.97 0.841 0.750 -0.026
0.96 0.974 0.962 0.818
0.95 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.94 0.987 0.982 0.727
0.93 0.959 0.944 -0.434
0.92 0.927 0.901 -3.269
0.91 0.894 0.857 -8.840
0.90 0.863 0.815 -17.998
0.89 0.834 0.776 -30.565
0.88 0.807 0.739 -44.899
0.87 0.782 0.705 -58.576
0.86 0.760 0.674 -69.745
0.85 0.739 0.645 -77.849
0.84 0.720 0.618 -83.321
0.83 0.703 0.593 -86.930
0.82 0.687 0.570 -89.365
0.81 0.672 0.548 -91.104
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0.99 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.54
persistence
R








0.99 0.89 0.79 0.69 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.29
persistence
R




















bb p_0.95 p_0.85 p_0.75 p_0.65









0.001 0.006 0.011 0.016 0.021 0.026 0.031 0.036 0.041 0.046
probability to enter hidden state
R











0.980 0.970 0.960 0.950 0.940
discount factor
R
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